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James D. Ghiardi

Wisconsin law is inconsistent as to whether

................... ................... .... .
day one, the day an action accrues, is to be

............................... ............ .
limitations period. Resolving this issue can
.............................................. .
included in computing a statute of

'

protect the claimant's right and remedy.

Frequently, courts and attorneys are faced with the issue
of how to compute the applicable period of limitation
under a specific statute of limitations.' Under the terms
of section 893.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes,' time is
computed from the time ofthe accrual of the right to the
time the action is conimenced. A cont1ict exists betWeen
the common law rule, that the day of accrual should be
included in the period of limitation, 3 and sections
990.001(4)(a) and (d) of the Wisconsin Statutes." Since
sections 990.001(4)(a) and (d) do not, by specific language, abrogate the common law, it cannot be presumed
that the Legislature intended to change the common law. 5
Sections 990.001(4)(a) and (d) only apply to "acts or
proceedings" and thus are only relevant to computing
time where a party is required to do an affirmative act.'
The accrual of a cause of action in tort does not require the
doing ofan affirmative act but is based on thediscovery
of the injury.' Because ofthe uncertainty created by
cases 8 applying sections 990.001(4)(a) and (d), lawyers
have been urged to include the day the action accrues in
the computation. 9

The uncertainty continues
Current Wisconsin law still is fraught with uncertainty
over determining when a statute of limitations period
begins to run. The uncertainty stems from the fact that
Wisconsin case law is inconsistent as to whether day one,
the day an action accrues, is to be included in computing
a statute of limitations period. Since there has been no
definite resolution of this issue by the courts or the
Legislature, lawyers are proceeding according to their
advantage. This has resulted in inconsistent holdings in
Wisconsin court decisions.
16
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Circuit court cases
In Dober! v. Lawien 10 the plaintiff's injury occurred on March 6, J 986. The action was
commenced on March 6, 1989. The court held that section 990.00 I (4) was not applicable
and that the last day that the plaintiff could have commenced the action was March 5,
1989.
The plaintiff in Elnwre v. StrohBrewery 'was it1juredouDec. 8, 1980,and the action
was commenced on Dec. 8, 1983. The trial court KHOG that the action was timely filed
on the theory that the supreme court's dicta L Q prior decisions 12 called for this
conclusion.
In Williams v. Town o(Caledonia 13 the trial c.ourt stated: " ... in a tort situation,
when computing the statute of limitations, because it is from the date- because
it is the time of an event as .opposed to the date, you incluGe the first day,
notwithstanding 990.001, sub. 4a, b, and d.''
The accident in Williams occurred at 11:30 p.m. on Oct 17, 1983. The action
was commenced on Oct. 17, 1986, at 5:40p.m. The court followed an exception
to the rule of counting whole days and divided up the day of the acciGHQW
because substantial rights were involved, and held
that the 5:40p.m. filing of the action was timely.
The trial court acknowledged that ordinarily
fractions of a day will not be considered,
particularly in reference to the commencement of an action. However, the court held
that the ordinary rule will not be applied
when an inquiry into the priority of acts on
the same day becomes necessary to protect
the rights of parties. 16

Courts of appeal cases
ThH inconsistency in thetrial courts is echoed in the :LVFRQVLQ
courts of appeal.
In Livesey v. Copps CRUp.,'7a nontort case, DQoption
a period of 12 months "from date of signing" was V L J Q H G 
on Nov. 15; 1976. A written notice that
option was mailed on Nov. 15, 1977, and UHFHLYHG on
Nov. 16, 1977. The court construed the optioQ
language "for a period of 12 months from the date
of signing" to haveexpired at midnight on Nov.
15, 1977. In .arriving at its decision, the District
IV court of appeals considered section
990.001(4)(a),(b) and (d) of the Wisconsin Stat
utes, but held that the common law rule applied
rather than section 990.001 (4 ), stating as follows:
'"The rule is well established on an issue of
March 1993

limitation where the time is to be computed from a certain date, that in the
computation the day of the date is to be
excluded, and where rhe computation is
from a certain event the date ofthat event
must be included.' Brown v. Oneida
Knitting Mills, 226 Wis. 662, 666, 277
N.W. 653 (1938), quoting from Siebert
v. Jacob Dudenhoefer Co., 178 Wis.
191 , 194, 188 N.W. 610 (1922); De
Forest Lumber Co. v. Potter, 213 Wis.
288,25 1 N.W. 442 ( 1933); North Shore
M. Co. v. Frank W. Blodgett Inc., 2 13
Wis. 70, 250N.W. 84 1 (1933). (Emphasis in original.)" 18
Tamminen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 19 dealt with a medical malpractice
issue involving the question of the tolling of the statute of limitations until 30
days after the Patients Compensation
PaneOissued its written report. The court
stated that when the plaintiff filed her
submission of controversy on Oct. 30,
1978, she had four days left before the
statute of li mi tations expired. 20 The alleged malpractice occurred on Nov. 4,
1975, and the submission of controversy
was filed on Oct. 30, 1978. If plaintiff
had only four days left, then the court
counted the first day (Nov. 4, 1975) for
purposes of computing the time.
In McMillan-Warner Mut. Ins. v.
Kauffman21 the complaint sought damages arising out of a fire that occurred on
March 24, 1981. An action was commenced on March 20, 1987, but the
summons and complaint were not served
on the defendant. A second amended
summons and complaint were filed on
March 25, 1987, and timely served on
the defendant. The court of appeals held
that the statute of limitations had run on
March 23, 1987, and the action was
therefore time-barred.22 Thus, without
any discussion or citation of authority,
the court included the day of accrual in
its computation of time toward the running of the statute of limitations.
The three foregoing opinions would
indicate that the Wisconsin courts of
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The inconsistency in the trial courts

........ ................................................
is echoed in the Wisconsin courts of
....................................................... .
appeal. Until the supreme court clears up
........................................................
the confusion, judges, lawyers and

..... ... ................................................
litigants must continue to guess when a

........................................................
statute of limitations period begins to run.

..... ..... ........... .... ........ ............ ...........
appeal would follow the common law
and count the first day in the computation of time. However, unpublished
decisions illustrate a continuing inconsistency in the case law.23
Schreiber v. Bennetr24 involved an
injury to a child at birth. The child was
born Oct. 2 1, 1963, and the plaintiffs
knew almost immediately the precise
illness that caused the injury. The District Ill court of appeals held that the
statute of limitations expired on Oct. 20,
1982, in the absence of the benefits of the
discovery rule. This was arrived at by
counting the first day in determining the
three-year period, and then tolling the
statute's application until o ne year beyond when the child attained the age of
majority.
The District I court of appeals has
been consistent in not counting the first
day. In a contract action, Don Devooght
House Moving v. Keinert, 25 the debt accrued on Oct. 28, 1982, and the action
was commenced on Nov. 15, 1989.
Without discussion or citation of authority, the court held that since the six-year
period of!imitations began to run on Oct.
28, 1982, the time could not be extended
beyond Oct. 28, 1988. In Johnson v. De
Clou[6 an automobile collision occurred
on Nov. 20, 1985. The court stated that
suit was to be commenced on or before
Nov. 20, 1988, again without discussion
or citation of authority.
Gutweiler v. Wisconsin Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co. is an unpublished opinion that
did discuss the issue of whether the day
of accrual should be counted as day one
of the statute of limitations. The appellate court in Gutweiler was asked to
decide whetherthe trial court erred when

it ruled that the day of an accident must
be included in the computation, so that
the plaintiff's action, which was filed on
Nov. 22, 1989, for an accident occurring
on Nov. 22, 1986, was time-barred. The
appellate court excluded the day of accrual in its computation and ruled that
the method of computation provided by
the general construction statute, section
990.001(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes,
which excludes the date of the accident
from the computation, applied to section
893.54. The court held that the action
was timely commenced and reversed the
trial court.
The court based its decision on the
Wisconsin Supreme Court' s decisions in
Hale v. Hale28 and Cuisinier v. Sattler, 29
stating that these cases spoke plainly to
the circumstances of the Gutweiler case
and required computation of the periods
in section 895 .54 and similar statutes of
limitation to be in accord with the specific directions of section 990.00 1(4);
therefore, time is to be computed by
excluding the ILUVW day and including the
last. The Gutweilercourt acknowledged
that if it were a law-declaring court it
might give one commentator's recommendations30 greater consideration, but
that as a court whose functions are primarily error-correcting, it was bound by
the decisions of the state's highest court.
It should be noted that the decision makes
no reference to two prior decisions by the
same court holding to the contrary.3 1 The
failure to consider or acknowledge prior
authority in current decisions has been
noted by one author as creating a serious
dilemma for judges, lawyers and li tigants.32
(continued on page 53)
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Computing
time ifrompageJBJ
Supreme court cases

Despi te several opportunities since 198 1
to clarify the issue of whether the fust
day is to be counted in computing time
for the purposes of the running of the
statute of limitations, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has not expressly done
so. In Tamminen v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. 33 the issue of when the statute
of limitations expired was considered in
Light of a fLOing with the Patients Compensation Panel and the "continuous treatment" doctrine. The issue of counting
the first day never became dispositive of
the case, but the court gave mixed signals on the issue. The trial court and the
court of appeals34 had impliedly counted
the first day and this was confirmed by
the supreme court
"It is conceded by all parties that,
whe n Tamminen filed her submission of
controversy with the patients compensation panel on Oct. 30, 1978, four days
remained before the statute of limitations ran o ut on the earliest claimed
negligent act of the defendant Kiskeh,
the surgery performed on Nov. 4 ,
1975 .... 35
"The plaintiff argued in the trial court
that the statute of limitations should not
begin to run until the health care providers' negligence ceased. The trial court
did not e ntire ly reject the plaintiff's argument or the evidence of her affidavits,
but relied upon the theory, for which it
couldfind supportin Wisconsin law, that
each day on which there is a negligent act
or omission commences the running of a
period of limitations on a new and different cause of action.
" Under the trial court 's reasoning, the
statute of limitations begins to run each
day for the negligent acts or omissions
which occurred on that day. Thus, the
trial court determi ned that the statute of
limitations barred the plaintiffs cause of
action w ith respect to most of the alleged
negligence, while it did not bar an action
for negligent acts or omissions that fell
within the period subsequent to Jan. 12,
1976."36
On the other hand, in computing the
lapsed time before the submission of the
controversy to the Patients Compensation Panel, the court did not count the
first day. "The period of negligent treatment ran from Nov. 3, 1975, to March
30, 1976. The controversy was submitted to the patients compensation panel
o n Oct. 30, 1978. At that point, two years
March 1993

and 21 4 days had elapsed followi ng the
date of last negligent treatment. At the
time of the submission of controversy
151 days re mained before the period of
limitations expired.
In Hester v. Williams38 the court excluded the day of accrual from its computation of the statute of limitations.
Hester involved a plaintiff who suffered
personal injuries on April 25, 1977, while
a passenger in an automobile. Although
the court was not deciding the issue of
when the statute of limitations began to
run , the court stated in a footnote to the
decision that the three-year statute of
limitations expired on April 25, 1980.39
In Borello v. U.S. Oil Co.40 the court,
in determining when "discovery" occurred, stated: " Fishburn's diagnosis and
findings were made on OcW. 30 , 1979. If
this is the date on which 'discovery ' took
place, the complaint filed o n Nov. 25,
1981, was timely filed as being within
three years o f discovery, the date which
commenced the running of the period of
limitations. The period of limitations, if
properly so computed, would not have
run until October of 1982.''41

The quote is ambiguous as to whether
the first day should be counted. If the
Hester2 case is the law, then the court
intended to say that the period of limitations would not have run until Oct. 30,
1982. One can' t help but wonder why
the day of the month was not specifically
stated.

Conclusion

Resolution of whether day one, the day
an action accrues, is to be included in
computing the statute of limitation is
critically important because an incorrect
computation can destroy the claimant's
right, as well as the claimant's remedy
In view of the number of times that this
issue bas arisen, the supreme court should
clear up the confusion at an early date.
Judges, lawyers and litigants shou ld not
have to guess as to the result. ln the
meantime, counsel, to be safe, should
continue to include the day o f accrual in
computing the time when the cause of
action accrues .
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